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Abstract:
Recent publicity about “concierge physicians” has raised concerns about the potential
adverse effects of allowing physicians to bill their patients for fees that are above normal
copayments and insurance reimbursements.  In particular, consumers who are unable to
afford the additional costs of such physicians are concerned that their access to high-
quality medical care could be compromised.  Such concerns in the context of Medicare
led states and the federal government, beginning in the late 1980s, to restrict the ability of
physicians to “balance bill” beneficiaries for charges in excess of the copayment and
reimbursement amounts approved by Medicare.  In this paper, I provide empirical
evidence that this policy change resulted in an 8% reduction in out-of-pocket medical
expenditures by elderly households.  In spite of the change in marginal reimbursement to
physicians, however, I find little evidence that the restrictions affected quantity or quality
of care.
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11. Introduction
Recent publicity about “concierge physicians,” who require substantial out-of-pocket
payments in excess of regular reimbursement by health insurance companies, has raised
concerns about the potential adverse effects of allowing physicians to bill some of their
patients for fees that are above normal reimbursement.  These physicians charge annual fees
in exchange for special services, such as cell-phone access to doctors, same-day
appointments, and accompaniment to specialist visits.  Consumers who are unable to afford
the additional costs of such physicians are concerned that their access to high-quality health
care could be compromised.  A 2002 New York Times editorial, for example, worried that, “if
a new category of ‘insurance-plus’ takes root, it will exacerbate what some patients and
doctors already believe is a two-tier medical system.”
This very concern led to one of the most important changes in the structure of the
Medicare physician program since its inception.  Before the late 1980s, physicians
participating in Medicare could “balance bill” beneficiaries for the difference between the
physician charge and Medicare’s reimbursement level.  In 1984, liability for balance billing
was $77 per beneficiary, or about 27% of the total part B out-of-pocket liability faced by
beneficiaries (Health Care Financing Review, 2000). During the late 1980s and early 1990s,
in an effort to protect beneficiaries from out-of-pocket liabilities, state and federal policies
restricted the ability of physicians to balance bill Medicare beneficiaries.  These restrictions,
like the more recent controversy about concierge physicians, raised concerns about how
balance billing—or the lack thereof—affects access to care and the quality of care provided.
Economic theory suggests that physicians could have responded to restrictions on
balance billing by adjusting the quantity and/or quality of services they provided to Medicare
2beneficiaries. Theory does not, however, provide unambiguous predictions about the
direction of the effect on physician behavior.  The predictions of standard models vary,
depending on whether the model incorporates quality of care as a choice variable or allows
for features such as demand inducement, physician income targeting, or demand constraints.
Furthermore, empirical research on the effects of balance billing restrictions has been quite
limited.  The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed data from the first four states
that implemented policies, but concluded that the available data covered “too short of a time
to determine whether physicians modified their behavior in response to the laws” (GAO,
1989, p. 37).   In this paper, I provide new empirical evidence on physician responses to
Medicare balance billing restrictions, using variation in the timing and location of restrictions
to identify their effects.
I begin by quantifying the effects of balance billing restrictions on household out-of-
pocket medical expenditures, using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  My
analysis indicates that balance billing restrictions led to an annual decline of approximately
$120 in out-of-pocket expenditures for physician services among households with elderly
members.1  This decline represents an 8% reduction in overall spending for medical services
among elderly households.
Next, I consider the effects of balance billing restrictions on the quantity of care
received by Medicare beneficiaries.  Because balance billing restrictions decreased the
marginal reimbursement for providing an additional medical service to the subset of
Medicare beneficiaries who were previously paying balance bills, physicians may have
responded by changing the supply of care available to Medicare patients. Using data from the
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3National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), I find no evidence that the number of doctor visits
provided to Medicare beneficiaries changed.
Since some specialties historically balance-billed Medicare beneficiaries more than
others and therefore faced larger changes in marginal reimbursement than other specialties, I
also consider the impact separately by physician specialty.  For example, balance bills added
an average of 7.5% to the Medicare allowed charges for the services of a family practitioner,
23% for the services of an anesthesiologist, and 24% for the services of an oral surgeon in
1990 (Helbing and Petrie, 1992).  Even among specialties that had relatively high balance
billing rates, however, I find little evidence of a change in the quantity of care.
To assess the effects of balance billing restrictions on the duration of doctor visits and
on the type of follow-up plans, I turn to a survey of doctor visits, the National Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey (NAMCS).   I interpret measures such as duration of doctor visits as
proxies for the quality of care.  Balance billing restrictions have no significant impact on the
duration of doctor visits, but do have a significant, negative impact on the likelihood of
planning a follow-up telephone call.  This result may reflect a decision by physicians to
spend less time with their Medicare patients in response to balance billing restrictions.  
Finally, I consider the general equilibrium effects of the restrictions in the market for
physicians.  Using aggregate data on the number of physicians per capita of each specialty
across states and over time, I find no significant evidence that the supply of physicians
declined in response to the decreased reimbursement.
In summary, the empirical results suggest that balance billing restrictions had few, if
any, consequences for the quality or quantity of care to Medicare beneficiaries.  The primary
impact, then, was a decrease in out-of-pocket expenditures among the subset of beneficiaries
4who were previously paying balance bills, which was the intention of the legislation.
Nevertheless, this impact represents redistribution from physicians to Medicare beneficiaries.
The welfare implications of the policy change, then, depend on the relative incomes and
importance assigned to affected physicians and affected Medicare beneficiaries in the social
welfare function.
2. Background and Legislative History
Medicare historically reimbursed physicians for their “customary, prevailing and
reasonable” fee, which meant that physicians were reimbursed by Medicare for the lower of
“(1) the actual charge (the billed amount), (2) the physician’s customary charge (the median
charge of all charges by that physician for that service over the previous 12 months), or (3)
the prevailing charge (sufficient to cover the customary charge for three out of four bills for
all physicians in the geographic area)” (GAO, 1989, p. 9).  Before 1984, doctors had a choice
of “accepting assignment” or not.  Doctors who accepted assignment would receive 80% of
the Medicare allowed charge directly from Medicare and could bill the patient for the 20%
copayment, but were not permitted to balance bill.  Doctors who did not accept assignment
would bill the patient for the full cost of the service, including the balance bill, and the
patient would be reimbursed by Medicare for 80% of Medicare’s allowed charge.2  Hence,
physicians who did not accept assignment were permitted to balance bill, but ran the risk of
receiving no payment for any of their charges.  In contrast, physicians who did accept
assignment were guaranteed payment of at least 80% of the Medicare fee, but were not
permitted to balance bill.
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5In the 1980s, there was growing concern about the financial liability faced by Medicare
beneficiaries and, as a result, a number of measures were taken to encourage physicians to
accept assignment.  In 1984, the “Participating Physician and Supplier Program” was
introduced, which defined a “participating physician” as a doctor who agreed to always
accept assignment for Medicare patients.  Between 1984 and 1990, numerous efforts were
made to persuade doctors to “participate.” Efforts included publishing a directory of
participating doctors for Medicare beneficiaries and offering a 5% higher Medicare allowed
charge to participating doctors than to non-participating doctors.  Also, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA 86) restricted the growth of billed charges for non-
participating doctors whose charges were greater than 115% of the national average
prevailing charge for the procedure to a nominal growth rate of 1% per year.
Effective in February 1986, doctors in Massachusetts were required to accept
assignment or lose their license to practice in the state.  This law (and subsequent laws that
restricted balance billing in other states) did not require doctors to treat Medicare
beneficiaries; it only required that, if they chose to treat Medicare beneficiaries, they could
not balance bill them.  To illustrate the impact of this legal change, consider a physician in
Massachusetts in 1985, who charged $120 per office visit and did not accept assignment.  If
Medicare’s allowed charge was $100, the physician would receive $80 from Medicare, a $20
copayment from the beneficiary, plus an additional $20 balance bill from the beneficiary.
After the passage of this law, the doctor could not charge the beneficiary for the $20 balance
bill.  Thus, the physician’s total reimbursement for this visit fell by 17% as a result of the
policy change and the patient’s out-of-pockets costs for the visit fell by 50%.
6In 1987, Connecticut, Vermont and Rhode Island implemented mandatory assignment
laws that applied to relatively low-income beneficiaries.  Based on their income, 68% of
Connecticut beneficiaries, 49% of Rhode Island beneficiaries, and 90% of Vermont
beneficiaries were eligible for mandatory assignment (GAO, 1989).  Effective January 1,
1990, Rhode Island’s mandatory assignment law was expanded to cover all beneficiaries.
Pennsylvania required all doctors to accept assignment, effective September 8, 1990.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 89) imposed federal
restrictions on balance billing (beginning in 1991) and legislated a new Medicare fee
schedule (beginning in 1992).  For each procedure/region, there was a “recognized payment
amount” for non-participating physicians, which was 95% of the recognized payment amount
for participating physicians.  There was also a “limiting charge” which was the upper bound
on billed charges by non-participating physicians.  In 1991, the limiting charge was 125% of
the recognized payment amount; this limit decreased to 120% in 1992 and 115% in 1993.
Since the fee for non-participants is 95% of the fee for participants, physicians have
effectively been permitted to bill their patients only 9.25% above the Medicare participating
physician fee since 1993.  New York implemented a more stringent limiting charge of 115%
of the recognized payment amount beginning in 1991; New York’s limiting charge fell to
110% in 1992.  Table 1 provides a summary of the law changes and indicates the share of
Medicare beneficiaries who were impacted by any type of balance billing restriction in each
year. Figure 1 shows the average per-beneficiary balance billing liability for each year
between 1977 and 1993.  As the figure illustrates, average per-beneficiary balance bills were
rising through the early 1980s, before beginning a decline that continued through 1993.
7Advocates argued that balance billing restrictions would lead to greater access to
medical care for the elderly.  In particular, they claimed that the elderly would be more likely
to obtain necessary medical care if they did not face any uncertainty about out-of-pocket
costs.  Uncertainty arises from the fact that patients do not always have the option to choose
their specialists and from the fact that an individual physician treating an individual patient
may choose to accept assignment on one visit, but not on another (GAO, 1989; Physician
Payment Review Commission (PPRC), 1988).  In addition, advocates pointed out that
roughly half of Medicare beneficiaries did not understand the term “assignment” and
approximately three-quarters had not heard of the Participating Physician and Supplier
program (GAO, 1989).  Given these facts, advocates argued that it was unreasonable to
expect beneficiaries to lower their out-of-pocket costs by finding and using a participating
physician.  Thus, they predicted that restrictions on balance billing would increase access to
care by the elderly.
Opponents argued that, as a form of price ceilings, balance billing restrictions would
have the opposite effect, reducing access to care for Medicare beneficiaries.  In particular,
they suggested that physicians would be less willing to treat Medicare patients and, when
balance billing regulations had been enacted in only a few states, physicians might move to
states with less restrictive policies (GAO, 1989).  In 1987, William McDermott of the
Massachusetts Medical Society said that, in response to Massachusetts’ balance billing
restriction, “you’re going to find a lessening of access for elderly patients” (UPI, 1987).
Likewise, Kirk Johnson of the American Medical Association suggested that, under such
policies, beneficiaries might receive inferior treatment (Wald, 1987). Concern about the
adverse effects of balance billing restrictions was sufficiently strong that, when the Puget
8Sound Council of Senior Citizens sponsored a public referendum in Washington to ban
balance billing, the state chapter of the AARP opposed it (PPRC, 1988).
As mentioned above, empirical evidence on the effects of balance billing restrictions is
limited.  The GAO completed a study in 1989, based on the initial evidence from restrictions
in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont.  In an analysis of Medicare
claims for these states between 1985 and 1987, the GAO found evidence of a decrease in out-
of-pocket spending by the elderly.  However, the authors concluded that insufficient time had
passed since the policies had been implemented to draw any conclusions about physician
behavior.  The short length of time between policy implementation and evaluation is a
particular concern if we believe that long-run physician responses may be stronger than
short-run responses.  In this paper, I provide evidence on longer-term responses, using data
that extends as far as 10 years beyond the first policy change in Massachusetts.
3. Theoretical Framework
Modeling the physician as an income-maximizer provides insight into how physicians
might respond to restrictions on balance billing.  Assume that a physician acts to maximize
his income:
(1) TotalTotalivTotaliviv QQcQQfQfQpI ⋅−−⋅+⋅= )()(),( PrPrPr
where p is the price charged to “private” (non-Medicare and Medicare non-assigned)
patients, QPriv is the number of “private” (non-Medicare and Medicare non-assigned)
patients, f is the Medicare fee,  QTotal is the total number of patients, and c is the cost of
treating a patient.  Note that QPriv is composed of two distinct groups of patients: non-
Medicare patients and Medicare non-assigned patients.  When balance billing is incorporated
9in this model, one of the two groups – the Medicare non-assigned – will be shifted out of
QPriv.
I assume that the cost of seeing patients increases with the number of patients seen, due
to actual costs of treatment and the physician’s demand for leisure (i.e. dc/dQTot>0).   I also
assume that the private price increases with Medicare fee (i.e. dp/df>0), which reflects the
fact that Medicare non-assigned patients are concerned only about their out-of-pocket costs.
If a non-assigned Medicare patient has met his deductible, his net out-of-pocket cost is the
standard copayment (20% of the Medicare fee, f) plus the balance bill (p-f).  That is, the net
price to a non-assigned Medicare patient is p-(0.8*f). Since an increased Medicare fee offsets
part of the net out-of-pocket cost, non-assigned Medicare patients are willing to pay higher p
to remain at the same level of out-of-pocket cost for any quantity of services.  To the extent
that the private market is dominated by non-assigned Medicare patients, dp/df may be close
to 0.8; to the extent that the private market is dominated by non-Medicare patients, dp/df will
be close to zero.  Finally, I assume that the physician faces a downward sloping demand
curve for private patient care (i.e. dp/dQPriv<0).  This assumption reflects the notion that
physicians are monopolistic competitors due to product differentiation.
The physician chooses QPriv and QTotal to maximize income.  The two first-order
conditions are:
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The first of these conditions, equation (2), indicates that a physician will provide
services to private patients until the marginal revenue from an additional private patient
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Pr  is equal to the marginal revenue (f) from an additional Medicare assigned
patient.  Rearranging equation (2) yields the elasticity of price with respect to QPriv:
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This equation implies that the elasticity increases with f and decreases with p.
Equation (3) indicates that the physician will provide services to patients until the
marginal cost of providing services to an additional patient 
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marginal revenue (f) from providing services to an additional patient. Rearranging this first-
order condition, we have the elasticity of cost with respect to QTotal:
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Figure 2, which follows earlier work on Medicare by Mitchell and Cromwell (1982),
Paringer (1982) and Zuckerman and Holahan (1991), graphically represents the physician’s
maximization problem.  As above, he stops seeing private patients when the marginal
revenue from private patients is equal to the marginal revenue of Medicare assigned patients;
thus, QPriv is established at the point where the two marginal revenue curves cross and the
price for private patients is set by the demand curve at that point.  The point at which the
physician stops seeing Medicare assigned patients is given by the intersection of the marginal
cost and marginal Medicare revenue curves.  It is possible for the physician’s marginal cost
curve to be sufficiently high that it intersects the private marginal revenue curve at a price
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above the Medicare marginal revenue curve, as shown in Figure 3.  In such a case, the
physician chooses never to treat assigned Medicare patients; his only Medicare patients will
be those patients who are willing to be balance-billed.
What does this theoretical framework predict about the effect of restricting balance
billing?  In the extreme case of banning any balance billing of Medicare beneficiaries, the
policy can be viewed as restricting the demand for physician services by private patients at
any given price level.  Specifically, a ban on balance billing would force the Medicare non-
assigned component of QPriv to join the Medicare assigned patients.  This would decrease the
demand by private patients and increase the demand by Medicare assigned patients.
Assuming that the physician was previously treating at least some Medicare assigned
patients, this change will decrease the number of private patients seen by a physician, without
changing the total number of patients seen.  In other words, the previously non-assigned
Medicare patients will simply become assigned Medicare patients and the overall quantity of
care will remain the same. Figure 4 illustrates the change.
If the physician was not previously seeing Medicare assigned patients (but was seeing
Medicare non-assigned patients at private-market prices), he may respond to balance billing
restrictions by treating fewer patients in total.  As shown in Figure 3, such a physician has a
sufficiently steep marginal cost curve that, in the pre-policy period, his marginal cost curve
intersected the downward-sloping (private) segment of the marginal revenue curve, rather
than the horizontal (Medicare assigned) segment of the marginal revenue curve.  After the
imposition of balance billing restrictions, he – like other physicians – faces downward shifts
in the private demand and private marginal revenue curves; unlike other doctors, he
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determines QTotal by the intersection of the private marginal revenue and marginal cost curves
and, therefore, may decrease QTotal in response to the restrictions.
Implementation of balance billing restrictions in the United States generally occurred in
an environment where Medicare fees were falling relative to prices that could be charged to
private payers.   Indeed, part of the motivation for restricting balance billing was concern
that, as the federal government decreased reimbursement rates to physicians, these decreases
for physicians would be passed through to Medicare beneficiaries in the form of increases in
balance billing.  According to the PPRC, Medicare fees in 1991 were 65%, on average, of the
prices that private payers and insurance companies were allowing for the same procedures.
This was a decline from 71% just two years earlier (PPRC, 1991).
Figure 5 illustrates the changes that physicians faced when Medicare balance billing
restrictions were imposed.  In response to the simultaneous decline in Medicare fees and
decline in demand for non-assigned Medicare services, this model suggests that physicians
would treat fewer “private” patients (and at a lower price) and would treat fewer total
patients.  Depending on the relative magnitudes of the declines in private demand and in
Medicare fees, a physician might increase or decrease the number of assigned Medicare
patients that he treats.  Thus, the model could provide theoretical support for either the
advocates or opponents of balance billing restrictions, depending on the parameters of the
model.
One caveat to the preceding model is that it assumes that demand does not constrain the
physician’s choice of the quantity of services provided.  This assumption may be unrealistic,
because beneficiaries always face out-of-pocket costs and, therefore, are unlikely to have
unlimited demand for physician services.  If demand were a constraint in the initial pre-
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policy equilibrium, restrictions on balance billing could cause demand to expand due to the
fact that beneficiaries face decreased out-of-pocket costs of obtaining physician services.  As
a result, the equilibrium quantity of services provided could increase.  This scenario roughly
corresponds to the perspective of advocates of the balance billing restriction policies.
The overall insight from the theoretical framework is that the impact of balance billing
restrictions is ambiguous.  Theoretical work by other authors adds more ambiguities.  Several
papers point to ways that the simple income-maximizing framework could be modified.
These papers raise substantial questions about the appropriate model of physician behavior,
but do not provide a clear consensus on the predicted effects of price controls, in general, or
balance billing restrictions, in particular.  For example, Feldman and Sloan (1988) and Glazer
and McGuire (1993) use models that incorporate both quantity and quality of care as choice
variables.  Wedig, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1989) highlight the potential issue of income
targeting by physicians, which could create a scenario where price controls lead to increases
in the quantity and quality of services.  In addition, Wedig, Mitchell and Cromwell (1989),
McGuire (2000), and numerous other authors have discussed the possibility of demand
inducement by physicians, which could also cause price controls to lead to increases in
quantity or quality of care.  In short, theoretical models of physician behavior have raised
important issues that increase the ambiguity of the predictions in the previous section.    The
goal of this paper, therefore, is to provide some empirical evidence about the direction and
magnitude of the effect of balance billing restrictions.
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4. Data
For my empirical analysis of the effects of balance billing restrictions, I turn to several
survey data sets.  Unfortunately, no single data source provides information on out-of-pocket
expenditures, quantity of medical care and quality of medical care during the time period that
corresponds to balance billing policy changes.  As a result, I use three different data sets,
each of which provides evidence on an important outcome that may be affected by balance
billing restrictions.  In addition, I use aggregate data on the number of physicians of different
specialties who are practicing in each state and year, in order to assess general equilibrium
effects of the restrictions.
The first survey data set that I use is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which
provides detailed quarterly household expenditure information. I use CEX data from 1984 to
1996, which allows me to analyze the effects of restrictions on out-of-pocket medical
expenditures by households with at least one elderly (aged 65 or over) member.  I exclude
households that are income-eligible for Medicaid, because there may be differences in
Medicaid policy across states and over time that could affect my dependent variables.  A
disadvantage of the CEX is that state identifiers are not available for smaller states.  As a
result, my sample includes only 38 states and the District of Columbia.  In particular, two of
the states that passed balance billing restrictions in 1987, Rhode Island and Vermont, are not
represented in my CEX data set.  The final sample includes 33,840 observations on elderly
households.  Categories of expenditures in the CEX are very detailed, so I am able to
separately analyze expenditures on physician services, prescription drugs, hospital services
and numerous other components of out-of-pocket medical spending.  In addition, the CEX
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provides data on household income, which permits analysis of the differential effects of
balance billing restrictions by income level.
The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) provides annual data about the health
care utilization of individuals.  I use the 1984-1994 data sets to provide evidence about the
effects of balance billing restrictions on health care utilization among Medicare beneficiaries.
I use two key variables from this survey as dependent variables in my analysis: the number of
doctor visits in the past 12 months and the number of doctor visits in the two weeks before
the interview.  The NHIS provides additional details about any visits in the previous two
weeks, including the type of doctor visited. I utilize this additional information in my
analysis to determine whether balance billing restrictions differentially changed access to any
particular physician specialty.  I include all individuals aged 65 and older in my sample,
except for individuals who are income-eligible for Medicaid.  The resulting data set includes
90,598 observations.
Finally, I use the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), which
provides data on a sample of doctor visits.  This data set includes information on the length
of the doctor visit and any plans for a follow-up to the visit; I use these variables as proxies
for quality of care in my analysis.  The NAMCS also includes detailed information on the
reason for the doctor visit as well as patient demographics, which are used as control
variables in my empirical analysis.  Patient income and, more importantly, state identifiers
are not available for the NAMCS during this period, so I implement a different empirical
strategy when I use this data.  My analysis includes survey data for the years 1985 and 1989
through 1994, including observations for patients aged 55 and over; no data were collected
from 1986 to 1988. Because all of the states that initiated their own balance billing
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restrictions before the federal restrictions were implemented in1991 are located in the
northeast and I am unable to identify these states due to the lack of state identifiers, I exclude
observations from the northeast of the United States and rely on an age-based identification
strategy, as explained below.  The resulting data set includes observations on 52,636 visits by
patients aged 65 or over and 23,201 visits by patients between the ages of 55 and 64.
5. Empirical Strategy
To identify the effects of balance billing restrictions, I exploit variation in balance
billing policy across states and over time.  The two primary control groups for the Medicare
beneficiaries who are affected by balance billing restrictions include:
1) Beneficiaries of the same age and in the same state, but in earlier years, who are
not yet affected by restrictions.
2) Beneficiaries of the same age and in the same year, but in states that are not
affected by restrictions.
The independent variable of interest in the CEX and NHIS regressions is a dummy variable
for being in a state and year with a balance billing restriction in place.  I control separately
for the direct effects of state and year, and rely on the interaction for identification.  The
basic regression takes the following form:
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where Yist  is a dependent variable for individual i in state s and year t. Dependent variables
include measures of out-of-pocket expenditures for physician services in the CEX
regressions and quantity of services in the NHIS regressions. Restrictionst is a dummy
variable that equals one for any person who lives in a state and year with a balance billing
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restriction in place.  States and Yeart are fixed state and year effects, respectively, and
States*Trendt is a state-specific linear time trend.  Xist is a vector of covariates, which
includes age group, gender, marital status, race, education, and income categories.  The CEX
regressions include additional controls for quarter of interview and size of consumption unit.
6. Empirical Results
6.1 Consumer Expenditure Survey
Summary statistics for the CEX are shown in Table 2.  Simple cross-tabulations of
physician services expenditures suggest that Medicare beneficiaries in states and years with
balance billing restrictions spent less on physician services than beneficiaries in other states.
Elderly households in states and years with balance billing restrictions spent an average of
$43 per quarter on physician services, whereas households in states and years without
balance billing restrictions spent an average of $85.3  Regression results provide a more
formal confirmation of these suggestive cross-tabulations.
The first set of regression results from the CEX is shown in Table 3 and indicates a
significant, negative effect of balance billing restrictions on physician and total medical
services expenditures.  Specifically, I find a quarterly decrease in out-of-pocket household
expenditures for physician services of about $30 for the treatment group.  This coefficient is
consistent with the aggregate data, which suggests that annual per-beneficiary balance billing
liability decreased by about $89 between 1985 and 1995 (U.S. Congress, 1994).  Out-of-
pocket expenditures on “total medical expenses,” which include physician services and
numerous other categories of services, also show a significant effect.  As a share of
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expenditures for physician services, the $30 impact of balance billing restrictions is a
substantial 44%; as a share of total medical expenditures, the restrictions cause an 8%
decline. The other categories of expenditures generally show no significant effects.  Those
categories that do have significant coefficients or large, insignificant coefficients are
categories of expenditures that are also likely to have been impacted by the balance billing
restrictions, such as hospital care and dental services.4
While not shown here, I find that these results are robust to the inclusion of an
additional control group, non-elderly households with heads between the ages of 55 and 64,
in a triple-difference framework.  This specification has the advantage of controlling for
secular trends that may affect patterns of medical care.  However, the theoretical framework
raises the possibility that this additional “unaffected” group may have experienced some
changes in medical care utilization due to changes in the Medicare market.  For example, the
declining Medicare fee, relative to private fees, during this period could have led to an
increase in provision of care to the non-elderly.  As a practical matter, however, the inclusion
of this additional control group has little impact on my main empirical results.
The finding that balance billing restrictions decrease expenditures for physician
services by 44% among elderly households raises the issue of the distributional consequences
of the restrictions.  While these restrictions may have been enacted to protect the elderly from
high out-of-pocket medical expenses, they presumably also protected some beneficiaries with
high incomes who did not have an obvious need for protection against balance billing
restrictions.  Table 4 provides evidence on this issue, derived from regressions that interact a
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(Helbing and Petrie, 1992).
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dummy variable for “high” income with Restrictionst.
5  “High” income is defined as any
income over $23,145 (in real 1999 dollars), the median for the elderly households in the data
set.  A significant, negative coefficient on the interaction term would imply that high-income
beneficiaries benefited more from the restrictions.  The results in Table 4 suggest that high-
income households experienced a significantly larger reduction in the level of out-of-pocket
physician expenditures.  While mean quarterly physician expenditures are higher in high-
income households than in low-income households, the reduction in out-of-pocket
expenditures as a share of mean expenditures for high-income households (46%) was greater
than the reduction for low-income households (36%).  However, these findings are not robust
to using total medical expenditures as the dependent variable or to the addition of the non-
elderly control group.  Therefore, overall, I conclude that balance billing restrictions
decreased the out-of-pocket liability of elderly households, but did not necessarily benefit
high-income elderly households more than low-income households.
6.2 National Health Interview Survey
I next turn to the NHIS to determine effects of balance billing restrictions on the
quantity of care provided to elderly beneficiaries. Table 5 shows summary statistics and
Table 6 presents evidence from OLS and Probit regressions about how balance billing
restrictions affected the quantity of physician care received by elderly individuals.6  The
regression coefficients in the first 2 rows provide no evidence that Medicare beneficiaries
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6 Since the dependent variables count the number of doctor visits of various types, a count model might
seem like a natural alternative to OLS or Probit.  However, 76% of observations report 0 visits of any type
in the past 2 weeks and 17% report 1 visit; therefore, the decision to have any visit, rather than the number
of visits, appears to be the margin that is most likely to be affected by balance billing restrictions for almost
all of the dependent variables.  The one exception is “visits in the past 12 months”; negative binomial
regressions using this dependent variable yield results that are similar to those shown in Table 6.
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received any more or less care as a result of balance billing restrictions.  The point estimates
for the number of doctor visits are all positive, but statistically insignificant.  The confidence
intervals for the OLS coefficient on the number of doctor visits in the past 12 months allow
for the possibility that balance billing restrictions decreased the number of visits by no more
than 11% and increased the number of visits by no more than 16% relative to the mean.  In
short, the restrictions do not appear to have affected the quantity of care received by
Medicare beneficiaries but, if they did affect the quantity, the effect was relatively small.
Since Helbing and Petrie (1992) reported wide variation among specialties in balance
billing patterns, I next consider the possibility that balance billing restrictions had different
impacts on different types of specialties.  To capture differential effects by specialty, Table 6
reports results from separate regressions for the number of visits in the past 2 weeks to six
different types of physicians.  Average 1990 balance billing as a share of the Medicare fee is
shown in the last column of the table for each specialty. The results do not suggest that
balance billing restrictions affected the quantity of care received, even for physicians with
relatively high average balance bills.
6.3 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey
Table 7 shows summary statistics for the NAMCS sample of doctor visits.  The
dependent variables in this data set include the duration of the doctor visit, as reported by the
physician, and the follow-up plans that were arranged.  I interpret these variables as proxies
for the quality of care received.  The statistics are shown separately for the 55-64 year old
control group in column 1, for the 65-75 year-old treatment group in column 2, and the 75
and older treatment group in column 3.  The 75 and older patients are excluded from some of
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the regressions in order to make the treatment and control groups more comparable.  As the
summary statistics show, excluding the oldest age groups creates a sample that appears to be
more homogeneous.
The identification strategy for the NAMCS differs from the basic regression framework
because state identifiers are not available in the NAMCS.  In this case, the potential control
groups are limited to:
1) Beneficiaries of the same age, but in earlier years, who are not yet affected by the
federal restrictions.
2) Patients of slightly younger ages (55-64) who are not Medicare beneficiaries and
are therefore not affected by balance billing restrictions.
While it is not necessarily reasonable to assume that a 55-year-old would have a
doctor’s appointment of the same length as a 74-year-old, this assumption is more reasonable
if the 55-year-old and the 74-year-old are suffering from the same health problem. So,
although it is impossible to use geographic variation to identify the impact of balance billing
restrictions, the use of age variation is more palatable in the NAMCS, since the data provides
detailed information about reasons for physician visits.
The framework for analyzing the effects of balance billing on Medicare beneficiaries in
the NAMCS is as follows:
(7) ait
t
ttaittaaait YearXPostAgeAgeY εγβδγα +++++= ∑*6565
where Yait measures a dependent variable for doctor visit i provided to a patient in age group
a in year t. In this empirical framework, Age65a is a dummy variable for the patient being
aged 65 or older and Postt is a dummy variable for years after 1990.  The coefficient of
interest is δ, which represents the effect of the patient being older than age 65 in the post-
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policy, as opposed to the pre-policy, period.  Xait is a vector of covariates, which includes the
physician’s specialty and the primary reason for the patient’s visit.  The identifying
assumption is that, conditional on the reason for a visit and other covariates, there are no
differential trends in the dependent variable among the two age groups. An alternative
regression, which may reduce concerns about differential trends in the age groups, excludes
observations over the age of 74 who are likely to be more different from the 55-64 age group.
Replicating this identification strategy as closely as possible in the CEX yields results
that are similar to the results shown in Table 3.  In particular, I use CEX data, but exclude
observations in the Northeast and control only for sex, age, race, year and quarter.  The effect
of the balance billing restrictions is identified using an interaction between a dummy variable
for being an elderly household and a dummy variable for being post-1990.  The results
indicate a statistically significant decline of $23.78 in quarterly expenditures for physician
services and a decline of $39.37, significant at the 10% level, in total quarterly expenditures
for medical care.  The fact that results in the CEX using this alternative identification strategy
are similar to results reported in Table 3, using the preferred geographic identification
strategy, suggest that this alternative identification strategy may successfully capture the
impact of the balance billing restrictions.
The results in Table 8 do not show substantial evidence of changes in the quality of
health care provision.  The only significant results indicate that physicians are less likely to
arrange a follow-up telephone call for the older age group after 1990.  The coefficient of
-.006 represents a 20% decline in follow-up phone calls relative to the mean.  This result is
present in the full sample as well as the younger, more homogeneous sub-sample. The
various types of follow-up plans are not mutually exclusive, so it is reasonable that there is
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no significant offsetting increase in another category of follow-up.  This result suggests a
small, negative impact on quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries after balance billing
restrictions were imposed.
In Table 9, I take advantage of variation in physician specialty.  A physician with
higher average pre-policy balance bills may react more strongly to balance billing restrictions
than a physician with low balance bills, because the physician with larger pre-policy balance
bills would face a larger percentage decline in marginal reimbursement for care to Medicare
beneficiaries.  To capture this effect, I interact the specialty-specific balance billing rates,
based on Helbing and Petrie (1992), with Age65it*Postt.  The coefficients on these interaction
terms are always insignificant but the standard errors are so large that it is impossible to rule
out the possibility of large effects. The results in Table 9 are therefore inconclusive.  Taken
together, the only evidence of changes in care quality from the NAMCS suggests a decrease
in follow-up phone calls, but no other apparent reduction in care quality.
6.4 Effects on Aggregate Physician Supply
One final and important issue is the general equilibrium effects of balance billing
restrictions.  The restrictions could have led to a decrease in the supply of physicians through
numerous mechanisms, including increases in physician retirement rates, physician migration
between states or slowdowns in physician immigration from foreign countries.  Opponents of
balance billing restrictions suggested that the supply of physicians would, in fact, decline as a
result of these policies.
Using aggregate data from numerous editions of the American Medical Association’s
publication, Physician Characteristics and Distribution, I consider whether there is an
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impact of balance billing policies on the number of physicians per 1000 residents in a given
state.  Using data from 1981 to 1993 on the number of doctors of each specialty in each state
and year, I test whether the supply of physicians in specialties that historically charged
relatively higher balance bills was more likely to decline in states with balance billing
restrictions.  I interact the balance billing rate of each specialty with Restrictionst.  The effect
of balance billing restrictions is, therefore, identified from the interaction of state, year and
physician specialty.  The regression model is saturated, with controls for state*year,
specialty*year, and state*specialty.  Specialties observed include: general surgeons,
internists, neurosurgeons, obstetrician-gynecologists, ophthalmologists, orthopedists,
pediatricians, plastic surgeons, psychiatrists, radiologists and thoracic surgeons.  Of these
specialties, pediatricians had the lowest level of balance billing, with an average balance bill
that was 4% of the Medicare approved charge in 1990, and anesthesiologists had the highest
level of balance billing, with an average balance bill that was 24% of the Medicare approved
charge in 1990.
The results in the first column of Table 10 provide little evidence of a decline in the
number of doctors per 1,000 residents in high balance billing specialties relative to low
balance billing specialties in states and years with restrictions.  The results in the second
column, which allow for the effect of the restrictions to vary over time, provide some
evidence of a decrease in physicians per 1,000 residents, beginning two years after policy
implementation, but the coefficient is significant at only the 10% level.  It seems reasonable
that physician labor supply would respond with a multiple-year lag.  The coefficient is not
statistically significant, but suggests that a specialty that had average balance bills that were
10% larger as a share of the Medicare allowed charge in 1990 experienced a relative decline
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of 5 physicians per million residents.  Relative to the mean of 105 physicians per million
residents, this effect is relatively small.
6.5 Policy Endogeneity Concerns and Sensitivity Tests
The possibility of policy endogeneity is a source of concern for my identification
strategy.  For example, it is possible that balance billing restrictions were first implemented
in states that had particular reasons to be concerned about the financial liabilities of their
elderly residents or in states where initial assignment rates were sufficiently high that
mandatory assignment would be a less binding constraint. Pre-policy assignment rates in
states that passed restrictions varied widely, from 58% in Connecticut to 94% in
Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  However, the mean assignment rate among states that
passed restrictions, at 78%, was higher than the national average of 60% (U.S. Congress,
1994). This fact suggests that balance billing restrictions were less of a constraint in states
that first passed restrictions. Consequently, my findings may underestimate the impact of
balance billing restrictions in a typical state.
In addition to restricting balance billing, OBRA 89 created the Medicare Fee Schedule,
which was implemented in 1992.  The new fee schedule changed the level of reimbursement
that was received by physicians, depending on their specialties and locations.  In general, the
Medicare fee changes favored primary care physicians and rural physicians.  If these price
changes were correlated with changes in balance billing restrictions, my estimates of the
impact of balance billing could be biased.   In order to address this concern, I test the
sensitivity of my empirical results to controlling for the percentage change in Medicare
payment rates between 1991 and 1993 by state and by primary care status (U.S. Congress,
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1994).  As an additional specification check, I run my regressions without post-1991 data.
My empirical results are not substantively changed by either specification check.
7. Conclusion
How physicians respond to differential payment rates across different types of patients
is an important issue for the design of reimbursement policy.  Concerns about physician
responses to such differences have arisen in the context of Medicare balance billing
restrictions and, more recently, in the context of “concierge physicians,” who charge out-of-
pocket fees substantially in excess of normal reimbursement limits.  Most recently, the New
York Times reported that a physician paid a $53,400 settlement to the government for
charging Medicare beneficiaries a $600 fee in exchange for extra services, such as round-the-
clock access to the physician and coordination of care with other providers (Pear, 2004).
Advocates and opponents have offered divergent views of the implications of charging such
fees, with little empirical evidence to substantiate these views.  In the historical context of
balance billing restrictions, policy advocates felt that restrictions would improve access to
care for the elderly, whereas opponents felt that restrictions would hinder access to care.
In this paper, I use variation in the timing of restrictions in different states to identify
the impact of balance billing restrictions. I find little empirical evidence that physicians
changed their behavior in response to the balance billing restrictions.  However, I do find
suggestive evidence of a decline in follow-up telephone calls associated with the restrictions.
Overall, these findings do not provide strong support for the views of either the advocates or
the opponents of balance billing restrictions. In the context of the recent debate about
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concierge physicians, these findings suggest that concerns about decreased access to care
among individuals who can’t afford additional fees may be overstated.
The empirical results do, however, suggest a decline in out-of-pocket spending of
roughly $120 per elderly household per year, which amounts to an 8% decline in overall
medical spending per household in the data.  There is some evidence that the reduction in
spending was concentrated among high-income beneficiaries, but this evidence is not robust
to alternative specifications. Regardless, this decline in spending represents a transfer from
physicians to Medicare patients and the welfare implications of the policy change depend
primarily on how this transfer affects the social welfare function
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Table 1:  Implementation of Balance Billing Restrictions
Year States implementing a policy Percentage of all Medicare
enrollees affected by a restriction
1986 Massachusetts 2.7%
1987 Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont 4.8%
1990 Pennsylvania 10.5%
1991 All remaining states 100%
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Table 2: CEX Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Physician services expenditures 65.90 284.68
Prescription drugs expenditures 113.83 206.73
Hospital services expenditures 29.06 558.08
Eye exams, treatment and surgery 13.62 105.84
Medical supplies 20.11 81.93
Dental services 68.46 284.70
Labs, tests, x-rays 10.16 81.59
Care in nursing homes, ambulances, etc 28.74 472.17
Other medical services expenditures 23.65 395.97
Total medical services expenditures 373.53 1058.24
Restriction .449 .497
Male .581 .493
Married .516 .500
Age of household head 71.53 9.68
Real household income 32,619 29,890
Household size 1.98 1.19
Observations 33,840
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Table 3: Medical Expenditures
Dependent variable
(in 1999 $)
(1)
Expenditures
(2)
Any
expenditures
(3)
Log
expenditures
(4)
Expenditures
(median)
Physician services -29.17**
(8.49)
-.052**
(.020)
-.156**
(.074)
Prescription drugs -16.54
(10.08)
-.027
(.033)
-.099
(.069)
Hospital -27.89
(20.05)
-.011
(.010)
-.448*
(.262)
Eye exams and
treatment
2.53
(2.91)
-.004
(.012)
-.015
(.096)
Medical supplies -.28
(3.55)
.004
(.011)
-.017
(.171)
Dental services -32.54*
(16.77)
-.035**
(.015)
-.081
(.141)
Labs, tests, x-rays -4.39
(2.71)
-.002
(.009)
-.445**
(.163)
Care in nursing homes,
ambulances, etc.
-79.70
(69.77)
-.011
(.009)
-.194
(.530)
Other expenses -11.98
(13.29)
.009
(.012)
-.109
(.176)
Total medical expenses -199.95*
(113.98)
-.017
(.014)
-.248**
(.063)
-31.57**
(12.30)
Number of observations 33,840 33,840 Varies 33,840
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on state and year.  Each coefficient is from a different regression and
represents the effect of living in a state and year with a balance billing restriction in place.  The row label indicates the dependent
variable; the column label indicates the specification of the dependent variable.  Controls include state, year, state trends, quarter of
interview, real income, household size and demographic characteristics (gender, marital status, gender*marital status, age, race and
education) of the household head.  Households that are income-eligible for Medicaid are excluded from the sample.  Columns 1 and 3
are estimated using OLS, column 2 shows marginal effects from Probit models, and column 4 is estimated using median regression.
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Table 4: Medical Expenditures by income category
Independent variable
(1)
Physician
Expenditures
(2)
Total Medical
Expenditures
Restriction -17.26**
(8.21)
-179.36
(110.31)
Restriction*High Income -21.57**
(5.68)
-36.55
(28.61)
Number of observations 33,840 33,840
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on state and year.  Each column shows coefficients from a different
regression.  The column heading indicates the dependent variable and the row label indicates the independent variable of
interest.Controls include state, year, state trends, quarter of interview, real income, household size and demographic characteristics
(gender, marital status, gender*marital status, age, race and education) of the household head.  Households that are income-eligible for
Medicaid are excluded from the sample.  Both columns are estimated using OLS.
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Table 5: NHIS Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Doctor visits in past 12 months 6.06 14.88
Doctor visits in past 2 weeks .368 .971
Ophthalmology visits in 2 weeks .024 .187
Internal medicine visits in 2 weeks .073 .412
Radiology visits in 2 weeks .015 .273
Orthopedic surgery visits in 2 weeks .014 .194
General practice visits in 2 weeks .146 .540
Psychiatry visits in 2 weeks .002 .052
Restriction .413 .492
Male .431 .495
Married .590 .492
Age 73.85 6.25
Observations 90,598
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Table 6: Quantity of Medical Care
Dependent variable
(1)
Number of
visits
(2)
Any visits
(3)
Number of
visits,
conditional on
any
(4)
Number
of visits
(median)
(5)
Balance
billing as
share of
Medicare
fee, 1990
Doctor visits in past
12 months
.156
(.420)
.005
(.008)
.169
(.462)
.120
(.096)
Doctor visits in past 2
weeks
.008
(.023)
.006
(.012)
.010
(.041)
Orthopedic surgery
visits
-.001
(.004)
-.0004
(.0011)
-.076
(.368)
9.83%
Psychiatry visits -.0001
(.0008)
-.0001
(.0001)
.090
(.701)
7.03%
Internal medicine
visits
-.007
(.008)
-.009**
(.004)
.164
(.106)
6.58%
General practice visits -.005
(.010)
.0001
(.0075)
-.043
(.045)
6.56%
Ophthalmologist visits -.004
(.003)
-.002
(.002)
.015
(.073)
4.17%
Radiology visits .006
(.005)
.001
(.002)
.987*
(.538)
4.02%
Number of
observations
90,598 90,598 Varies 90,598
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on state and year.  Each coefficient is from a different regression and
represents the effect of living in a state and year with a balance billing restriction in place.  The row label indicates the dependent
variable; the column label indicates the specification of the dependent variable.  Controls include state, year, state trends, real income,
gender, marital status, gender*marital status, age, race and education.  Individuals who are income-eligible for Medicaid are excluded
from the sample. Columns 1 and 3 are estimated using OLS, column 2 shows marginal effects from Probit models, and column 4 is
estimated using median regression.  Column 5 shows specialty-specific average balance billing as a share of the Medicare fee in 1990,
as reported in Helbing and Petrie (1992).
36
Table 7: NAMCS Summary Statistics
Means and standard deviations
Variable Aged 55-64 Age 65-75 Age 75+
Duration of visit 18.85
(14.25)
18.51
(13.71)
18.23
(13.32)
No follow-up planned .068
(.252)
.052
(.222)
.046
(.210)
Return at specified time .671
(.470)
.719
(.450)
.739
(.439)
Return if needed .189
(.392)
.159
(.365)
.150
(.357)
Telephone follow-up
planned
.032
(.176)
.032
(.177)
.032
(.177)
Refer to other physician .034
(.181)
.031
(.173)
.032
(.175)
Return to referring
physician
.021
(.143)
.022
(.145)
.019
(.136)
Admit to hospital .015
(.121)
.017
(.128)
.017
(.129)
Restriction 0
(0)
.482
(.500)
.501
(.500)
Male .442
(.497)
.450
(.498)
.410
(.492)
Age 59.53
(2.88)
69.40
(2.83)
80.45
(4.54)
Observations 23,201 29,618 23,018
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Table 8: Quality of Medical Care
Dependent variable Full sample
(Ages 55+)
Ages 55-75
Duration of visit (in
minutes)
.012
(.270)
-.063
(.244)
No follow-up planned .005
(.005)
.005
(.006)
Return at specified time -.005
(.008)
-.007
(.009)
Return if needed -.001
(.005)
.002
(.006)
Telephone follow-up
planned
-.005**
(.002)
-.006**
(.002)
Refer to other physician .004
(.003)
.004
(.003)
Return to referring
physician
-.0004
(.002)
-.002
(.002)
Admit to hospital -.0003
(.003)
-.00002
(.003)
Number of observations 75,837 52,819
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on physician specialty.  Each coefficient is from a different regression and
represents the effect of being aged 65 or older in a year with a balance billing restriction in place.  The row label indicates the
dependent variable; the column label indicates the data sample used for the regression.  Controls include age, sex, race, region, year,
physician specialty and primary reason for visit.  Patients with Medicaid as an expected source of payment are not included in the
sample.  Coefficients in the first row are estimated using OLS; other rows show marginal effects from Probit models.
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Table 9: Quality of Medical Care
Shows coefficients on interaction with
balance billing as a share of Medicare allowed charge
Dependent variable Full sample
(Ages 55+)
Ages 55-75
Duration of visit (in
minutes)
3.57
(12.37)
5.30
(9.99)
No follow-up planned .003
(.218)
.093
(.235)
Return at specified time .461
(.418)
.390
(.460)
Return if needed -.115
(.266)
-.316
(.319)
Telephone follow-up
planned
.053
(.116)
.067
(.134)
Refer to other physician .173
(.157)
.169
(.147)
Return to referring
physician
-.050
(.097)
-.038
(.109)
Admit to hospital -.092
(.104)
-.093
(.104)
Number of observations 71,752 49,761
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on physician specialty.  Each coefficient is from a different regression.  The
row label indicates the dependent variable; the column label indicates the data sample used for the regression.  Controls include age,
sex, race, region, year, physician specialty, primary reason for visit, and interactions between over age 65, post-policy and the
Medicare income share.  Patients with Medicaid as an expected source of payment are not included in the sample.  Coefficients in the
first row are estimated using OLS; other rows show marginal effects from Probit models.
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Table 10
Physician Per 1,000 Residents, by Specialty
Independent variable, interacted with
balance billing as a share of Medicare
allowed charge, 1990
(1)
Doctors per
1,000 residents
(2)
Doctors per
1,000 residents
Restriction -.00003
(.00019)
Restriction, t=0 .000002
(.0001)
Restriction, t=1 -.00003
(.00021)
Restriction, t>=2 -.0005*
(.0003)
Observations 6,732 6,732
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on state.  Each column shows the coefficients from a different regression.
Controls include physician specialty, state, year and second-order interactions of these variables.  Coefficients are estimated using
OLS.  The mean of the dependent variable is 0.105 physicians per 1,000 residents.
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Figure 2: The physician’s maximization problem
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Figure 3: The physician’s maximization problem
when marginal costs are steep
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Figure 4: The physician’s maximization problem
when balance billing is banned
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Figure 5: The Physician’s Maximization Problem
when balance billing is banned and Medicare fees decline
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